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Convenant of Habitability and the
Ohio Landlord-Tenant Legislation
A COVENANT OF HABITABILITY IN RENTAL AGREEMENTS is emerging
in Ohio as the tenant's most effective means of obtaining the
suitable dwelling which was contracted for and for which the rental
payments provide the consideration. Yet, so deeply rooted in history
and the common law are the real property concepts of leases as con-
veyances of possession involving independent agreements between the
landlord and the tenant, inherently favoring the landlord or fee
owner, that laws and court decisions have only recently begun to re-
flect the realities of today's urban life.
With one exception noted later,1 Ohio courts have been loathe to
accept the fact that enforcement of housing codes has been singularly
ineffective on a large scale. Without an implied covenant of habit-
ability in rental agreements, the indigent tenant today, living in
squalid conditions and often lacking a viable alternative, has no
effective means of bettering his condition. To remedy this problem,
the Ohio legislature, on July 23, 1974, passed Amended Substitute
Senate Bill Number 1032 defining the respective rights and obligations
of landlords and tenants by holding the lessor of residential property
3
to an implied covenant of habitability and providing several remedies
for enforcing that warranty.4 This Note will explore the public policy
favoring such a covenant, and also much of the existing common and
statutory law already recognizing the seriousness of the plight fac-
ing the urban tenant. Additionally, Ohio's landlord-tenant legislation
will be examined to determine the respective rights, duties and respon-
sibilities of both parties to a rental agreement.
Present landlord-tenant case law in Ohio draws from theories
dating back to English feudal times when the lease was regarded as
a grant or conveyance of the premises for a certain period of time,
binding the serf to his lord. Under that system, the serf acquired, an
estate in the land reflected by his possession which was limited in
1Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972). As this
article goes to press a similar decision, citing Glyco, was rendered by Judge Ann McMana-
mon of the Cleveland Municipal Court. Lable & Co. v. Brooks, Nos. B-89208 and B-89207
(Cleveland Mun. Ct. Ohio, August 20, 1974).
2 Am. Sub. Ohio S.B. No. 103, 110th General Assembly, § 5321.04(A) (2) (1973-1974).
[hereinafter cited as Ohio Bill 103]. Ohio Bill 103 amends §§ 1923.02, 1923.04, 1923.06,
and 1923.14 and enacts 1923.061, 1923.081, 1923.15, and 5321.01 to 5321.19 of the
Ohio Revised Code. The Ohio Bill 103 is a compromise of bills originating in the Senate
and the House, S.B. 103 and H.B. 796, respectively, necessitated when the Senate refused
to approve amendments sought by the House. According to Rep. Harry Lehman, the new
law is expected to take effect about Nov. 4, 1974. Letter from Rep. Harry Lehman to
Cleveland State Law Review, July 25, 1974.
3 id. §§ 5321.01 (B), (C), (F) and 5321.07(C).
4 d. § 5321.07. But note the exception of § 5321.07 (C).
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scope by the operation of the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.5
Once the lease was signed, the landlord's only legal duty was delivery
of possession which rendered the tenant liable for rent. The focus of
the courts has been on the tenant's mere possession rather than the
landlord's "service.' '6 As a result the landlord's failure to maintain
or repair the dwelling unit, even if expressly promised in the lease,
did not release the tenant from his obligation to pay rent. Further-
more, any such service-oriented covenants have been viewed inde-
pendently of the covenant to pay rent.7
The tenant's duty to pay rent was suspended only if the landlord
interfered with the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the land, actually
repossessed the property, 8 or if fraud or mistake in procuring the
lease could be proved.9 The rule of caveat emptor reflects the follow-
ing facts: that the primary reason for the rental payments during
feudal times was use of the land rather than the buildings; that the
condition of the land was known or could have been ascertained
equally by the landlord and the tenant; and that the buildings were
of simple construction without modern conveniences.10 To a farmer
or commercial tenant, perhaps, the land may still be of primary im-
portance, however the urban tenant's principal concern is finding a
suitable place to live.1 Not only does the low and middle income
tenant lack the specialized maintenance skills of the farmer, but also
his relatively short-term interest in the leasehold makes financing of
major repairs difficult and impractical. 12
In today's industrialized urban society, public policy considera-
tions necessitate a second look at the historical common law concept
of the lease as only a conveyance of possession rather than as the
rental of a suitable place for human habitation. Acknowledging the
inadequacy of traditional property law concepts in servicing the needs
of the urban, indigent tenant, the courts gradually began to allow
various exceptions which softened the harsh effects of strict adher-
ence to the independent covenant theory.1 3 Certain circumstances, they
5 See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595, 111 N.W.2d 409,412 (1961); G. THOMPSON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1230 (1959).
6Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 837 (Mass. 1973), citing
Note, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 489, 490 (1971).
7 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A) (4) and (6) in conjunction with § 5321.12.
8 See, e.g., Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201 (1870).
9 See, e.g., Robbins v. Jones, 15 C.B.N.S. 221, 240; 143 Eng. Rep. 768, 776 (C.P. 1863).
ISLemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 429, 462 P.2d 470, 472-73 (1969); see Berzito v.
Gambin, 63 N.J. 460, 468, 303 A.2d 17, 21 (1973).
11 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cit. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
12 Id. at 1078-79.
13 Comment, Tenant Protection in Iowa - Mease v. Fox and the Implied Warranty of Habit-




concluded, justified holding the landlord to an implied warranty to
furnish a place suitable and fit for its purpose as a dwelling. Perhaps
the earliest exception arose from the rental of a furnished home for
a term of one year or less, 14 as, for example, a vacation cottage. This
exception was based on the tenant's expectation of immediate occu-
pancy and enjoyment of the premises, and the lack of an adequate
opportunity to inspect it prior to commencement of the lease term.1 5
Another exception applied to dwellings leased before the completion
of construction, since obviously the uncompleted buildings could not
be adequately examined.1 6 Exceptions were also recognized in situa-
tions where landlords retained at least partial control over common
areas found to be defective,1 7 and where the landlord had an obliga-
tion to disclose to the tenant any known latent defects.18
Many of these exceptions have been based upon the doctrine of
constructive eviction. However, under this theory the only way that
a tenant may be permitted to withhold rent due to the landlord's
breach of the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the property is if the
tenant actually vacates the premises.1 9 Many courts still cling to the
idea that possession is the key to the lease and only its loss will con-
stitute failure of consideration. This remedy is most inappropriate
when the tenant cannot locate or afford another more suitable dwell-
ing.20 This, coupled with the fact that the tenant could remain liable
for the balance of the rent if his reasons for vacating the premises
were later determined to be inadequate, 21 makes the remedy of ques-
tionable value.22
Under the recently enacted Ohio legislation, the state has seem-
ingly severed its ties with feudal doctrines. No longer will a lease of
residential property in Ohio be regarded as merely a grant of pos-
session; instead, it will now be considered a mutually binding agree-
ment between two contracting parties.2 3 On the one hand there is the
14 Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); accord, Young v. Povich, 121 Me.
141, 143, 116 A. 26, 27 (1922).
15 Id.
16 Markman v. Hoefer, 252 Iowa 118, 123, 106 N.W.2d 59, 62 (1960).
17Strupka v. Scheidel, 244 Iowa 442, 56 N.W.2d 874 (1953). See also Ohio Bill 103
§ 5321.04 (A) (3).
18Wright v. Peterson, 259 Iowa 1239, 146 N.W.2d 617 (1966).
19 See, e.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
20Consider the effect of Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.03(A) (3) with respect to the landlord's right
to maintain an action for possession under Chapter 1923 of the Revised Code. If such right
were not granted to the landlord, would compliance with applicable building, housing,
health and safety codes requiring alterations, remodeling, or demolition of the premises
amount to a constructive eviction? Isn't the legislature then sanctioning such "remedy"
even though the validity of the doctrine in today's society is questionable?
21 Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 468, 308 A.2d 17, 20 (1973).
2 See note 20 supra.
23 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.06.
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landlord whose objective is to lease the property for profit. The duties
and obligations placed upon the landlord by the Ohio legislature24
are intended to be commensurate with that goal. If a realistic, legiti-
mate profit is to be made from the lease of his property, the lessor
will be required to provide a suitable dwelling place as one part of
the bargain. On the other hand there is the tenant whose sole desire
is to find a place to live - a safe, suitable residence conducive to the
health and welfare of a family, in exchange for a fair rental price
and agreement to undertake specific responsibilities25 in proportion
to the quantity and quality of the property received in return.
No one can expect an entrepreneur investing capital in residen-
tial real estate to be burdened with oppressive requirements for its
maintenance beyond those of providing a fit and habitable place for
tenants to live, any more than one should expect a family to accept
unsafe and unhealthy conditions over which it may have little or no
control. By recognizing this fact, the Ohio legislators have taken a
large step toward placing the respective parties to a rental agree-
ment in a position of equality. The new legislation recognizes that
both parties to a lease have certain interests which can and must be
protected.
The Development of Modern Law
The Lease as a Contract
The finding of a warranty of habitability in a lease today, whether
the result of public policy considerations, the weakening of the com-
mon law through numerous exceptions, or the logical extension of im-
plementing housing codes, is the recognition of the essentially con-
tractual nature of a lease with mutually dependent promises. 26 Under
this interpretation, the lease is viewed as a contract between the
landlord and tenant whereby the tenant's contractual obligation to
pay rent is conditioned upon the landlord's promises, express or im-
plied, to deliver and maintain the leased premises in a manner suit-
able for habitation. 27 Applying this concept to a finding that the
tenant did not have a remedy available to him, one court, in Marini
v. Ireland,28 stated:
2Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04.
25 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.05.
26 Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426,433,462 P.2d 470,474 (1969). See also Note, Contract
Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 BosTON U. L. REv. 24, 25 (1970); Ohio Bill 103
§ 5321.06.
27See, e.g., Javins v. First Na'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 842
(Mass. 1973). The new Ohio law, acknowledging this essential mutuality of covenants,
would specifically forbid the receipt of rent independent of the landlord's legal obligations.




[A] covenant in a lease can arise only by necessary implica-
tion from specific language of the lease or because it is in-
dispensable to carry into effect the purpose of the lease.2 9
(emphasis added).
When one considers the contractual nature of a rental agree-
ment, inherent warranties of habitability and fitness for the partic-
ular purpose intended by the lessee are found to be comparable to the
warranties of merchantability and quality found in today's sales con-
tracts that protect the purchaser's legitimate expectations. 30 Yet,
while an implied warranty based on an analogy to sales law offers
flexible remedies modeled after the Uniform Commercial Code, such
warranties may be subject to a disclaimer of liability. On the other
hand, although an implied warranty based on housing codes would
preclude disclaimer of liability, such a model may lack the desired
remedial flexibility.31
In Lauch v. Morning,32 an Ohio court regarded the written
lease as a contract thereby giving the court jurisdiction under ORC
1901.18(c) to "hear and determine all legal and equitable remedies
necessary or proper for a complete determination of the rights of the
parties" to the contract.33 This partial opening of the door to equit-
able determinations has begun to provide a further basis upon which
"just" results can be reached in the landlord-tenant conflict.34
The new Ohio provisions enable the landlord and tenant to agree
to anything in the rental agreement provided it is not inconsistent
with new Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code or does not contravene
any rule of law.35 A court, while reviewing such an agreement in the
process of resolving a landlord-tenant dispute may refuse to enforce
all or part of the contract, or may limit any of its provisions in such
a manner as to avoid an unconscionable result.36 Thus, form agree-
ments of the past which have variously been termed "contracts of ad-
hesion" or "take-it-or-leave-it" leases involving a form of overreach-
29 Id. at 143, 265 A.2d at 533.
30 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970). Such implied warranties are widely accepted and enacted in nearly
all states as part of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-314; Bixby, Implied Warranty
of Habitability: New Right for Home Buyers, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 468 (1972).
31 Comment, Tenant Remedies - The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 16
VILL. L. REV. 710, 726-28 (1971). See Ohio Bill §§ 5321.13(A), (D) and 5321.14.
3 15 Ohio App. 2d 112, 239 N.E.2d 675 (1968).
LId. at 114, 239 N.E.2d at 677.
3 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.14 provides an ample basis for the courts to "do equity" by avoiding
agreements or specific clauses to prevent an unconscionable result.
3 5 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.06.
36 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.14.
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ing by the landlord will now have to meet stricter standards. No
longer may leases contain "confession of judgment" clauses to recover
rent or damages 37 nor may either party require the other to pay at-
torney fees should litigation result from the agreement.38 Exculpa-
tory clauses (often attacked on the basis of unconscionability), limi-
tations of liability, or indemnification of the landlord have also been
forbidden. 39 Nor may the landlord assign or otherwise encumber the
lease with a provision for receipt of rent without also transferring
his obligations to provide suitable premises.40 Finally, with respect
to the landlord's obligations under Chapter 5321, no oral or written
rental agreement may be entered into which would modify or waive
such provisions.4'1 The landlord, however, may agree to assume any
of the duties or obligations of the tenant.42
While it may appear that the pendulum has swung in favor of
the tenant under the new act, in actuality it has not yet reached the
passive midpoint. True, the landlord now has a number of obligations
and responsibilities never before imposed upon him.43 There are,
however, exceptions to the lessor's obligations which have been built
into the legislation as a result of various lobbying interests, the most
notable being the exemption of landlords of fewer than four dwell-
ing units and private college and university dormitories.4 In no way,
however, may the requirements which have been imposed upon a
landlord be construed as oppressive or burdensome. Their basis, and
the standard to be applied in determining compliance with the legis-
lative intent, is found in the applicable building, housing, health, and
safety codes of the locality in which the premises are situated.
45
Housing Codes as a Vehicle for Granting Relief
Reflecting changes in the previously noted concept of the lease
as a grant of possession only, all of the states and most major munici-
palities have enacted housing or building regulations setting stand-
ards for the operation and maintenance of existing buildings and the
construction of new structures. 6 As Justice Holmes observed in 1921:
37 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13(B).
5Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13(C).
9 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13(D).
40Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13(E).
41 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13(A).
42 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13(F).
43Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.04, 1923.04 and 1923.06.
"Ohio Bill 103 §5321.07(C) (as to tenant remedies under § 5321.07).
4sOhio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A) (1).
46 See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965). See
also J. FRIED, HOUSING CRISES U.S.A. 136-38 (197 1); P. MARTIN, THE ILL HOUSED, 1022
(1971); Comment, IOwA L. REV. supra note 13. Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.19 provides that
the provisions of Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code are not intended to preempt housing,




"Housing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest
justifying some degree of public control are present."'7 Noting this
trend, the Wisconsin court in Pines v. Perssion8 stated:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability
in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the cur-
rent legislative policy concerning housing standards. The
need and social desirability of adequate housing for people
in this era of rapid population increases is too impor-
tant to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal cliche, "caveat
emptor."49
Housing code provisions, to be meaningfully and effectively im-
plemented, must be read into a lease. 50 The lease of residential prop-
erty to a tenant should impose upon the landlord a continuous obliga-
tion to maintain the premises in compliance with applicable state, and
local laws,5 1 the rationale being that the parties to such a contract,
had they thought it necessary, would have expressly incorporated ex-
isting laws into the lease.52 As a result, many local housing codes and
some state statutes establish minimum standards of maintenance
which the landlord is legally bound to attain.
Even in a distinctly agricultural state such as Iowa, for example,
the law sets state-wide minimum habitability standards, allowing local
municipalities to elevate such standards when desired.5 As early as
1873, before the enactment of specific housing codes, a far-sighted
California legislature imposed upon the landlord the burden not only
of conveying, but also of maintaining the premises in a tenantable
condition fit for human occupancy excepting only those conditions
caused by the tenant's lack of due care and those repairs expressly
(Continued from preceding page)
building, health or safety codes of any municipal corporation. Rather, these codes are
relied upon as a basis for determining the obligations of the respective parties in many
situations. See, e.g., Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.02(A) (1), 5321.03(A) (2), 5321.03(A) (3),
5321.04(A) (1), 5321.05(A) (5), 5321.07(A), 5321.09(A) (3), 5321.09(C), 5321.11
and 5321.19.
7 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 136 (1921), cited in Depaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 394,
272 A.2d 500, 504 (1971).
4 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
" Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 4 12 -13 .
S0 Gillette v. Anderson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972); Glyco v. Schultz, 35
Ohio Misc. 25, 31, 289 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972).
s1 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); accord, Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325,
326-27, 323 N.Y.S. 2d 363 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971). See Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.04(A)
(1) and 5321.06.
s
2 Schiro v. W. E. Gould Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 544, 165 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1960).
53IowA CODE ANN. § 413.125 (1949). Note that Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.19 provides that
Chapter 5321 is not intended to preempt any housing, building, health or safety codes of
any municipal corporation.
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undertaken by the tenant in the written lease ;m and over the years
the landlord's duties in California have become even more exacting
and detailed. 55 A Minnesota statute is similarly illustrative of those
laws holding the landlord to a covenant of habitability, the landlord
4 Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1929 (West 1954) (enacted 1872, as amended Stats. 1905, c.
454 § I) and CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (West 1954) (enacted 1872, as amended Code Ann.
1873-74, c. 612, § 205) with Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A) (1) and (2) and 5321.03(A)
(2) and 5321.05 (A) (5).
SSSee, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 (West Supp. 1974). Untenantable dwellings:
A dwelling shall be deemed untenantable for purposes of Section 1941 if it
substantially lacks any of the following affirmative standard characteristics:
(a) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior
wall including unbroken windows and doors.
(b) Plumbing facilities which conformed to applicable law in effect at the
time of installation, maintained in good working order.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is under the
control of the tenant, capable of producing hot and cold running water, or a
system which is under the control of the landlord, which produces hot and cold
running water, furnished to appropriate fixtures, and connected to a sewage dis-
posal system approved under applicable law.
(d) Heating facilities which conformed with applicable law at the time of
installation, maintained in good working order.
(e) Electrical lighting, with wiring and electrical equipment which con-
formed with applicable law at the time of installation, and maintained in good
working order.
(f) Building, grounds and appurtenances at the time of the commence-
ment of the lease or rental agreement in every part clean, sanitary, and free from
all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin, and all
areas under control of the landlord kept in every part clean, sanitary, and free
from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents, and vermin.
(g) An adequate number of appropriate receptacles for garbage and rub-
bish, in clean condition and good repair at the time of the commencement of the
lease or rental agreement, with the landlord providing appropriate serviceable
receptacles thereafter, and being responsible for the clean condition and good
repair of such receptacles under his control.
(h) Floors, stairways, and railings maintained in good repair.
§ 1941.2 - Lessee's affirmative obligations:
(a) No duty on the part of the lessor shall arise under Section 1941 or
1942 if the lessee is in substantial violation of any of the following affirmative
obligations:
(1) To keep that part of the premises which he occupies and uses dean
and sanitary as the condition of the premises permits.
(2) To dispose from his dwelling unit of all rubbish, garbage and other
waste, in a dean and sanitary manner.
(3) To properly use and operate all electrical, gas and plumbing fixtures
and keep them as clean and sanitary as their condition permits.
(4) Not to permit any person on the premises, with his permission, to
willfully or wantonly destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the
structure or dwelling unit or the facilities, equipment, or appurtenances thereto,
nor himself do any such thing.
(5) To occupy the premises as his abode, utilizing portions thereof for liv-
ing, sleeping, cooking or dining purposes only which were respectively designed
or intended to be used for such occupancies.
(b) Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) shall not apply if the lessor
has expressly agreed in writing to perform the act or acts mentioned therein.
Compare the California statute with Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.04 and 5321.05:
Sec. 5321.04. (A) A landlord who is a party to a rental agreement shall:




(Continued from preceding page)
(1) comply with the requirements of all applicable building, housing,
health, and safety codes which materially affect health and safety;
(2) Make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and
keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) Keep all common areas of the premises in a safe and sanitary condition;
(4) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning fixtures and appli-
ances, and elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him;
(5) When he is a party to any rental agreements that cover four or more
dwelling units in the same structure, provide and maintain appropriate receptacles
for the removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the occu-
pancy of the dwelling unit, and arrange for their removal;
(6) Supply running water, reasonable amounts of hot water and reason-
able heat at all times, except where the building that includes the dwelling unit
is not required by law to be equipped for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is
so constructed that heat or hot water is generated by an installation within the ex-
clusive conrol of the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility connection;
(7) Not abuse the right of access conferred by division (B) of Section
5321.05 of the Revised Code;
(8) Except in the case of emergency or if it is impracticable to do so, give
the tenant reasonable notice of his intent to enter and enter only at reasonable
times. Twenty-four hours is presumed to be a reasonable notice in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
(B) If the landlord makes an entry in violation of division (A) (8) of this
section, or makes a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner, or makes repeated
demands for entry otherwise lawful which have the effect of harrassing the
tenant, the tenant may recover actual damages resulting therefrom and obtain
injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, and if he obtains a
judgment reasonable attorney fees, or terminate the rental agreement.
Sec. 5321.05. (A) A tenant who is a party to a rental agreement shall:
(1) Keep that part of the premises that he occupies and uses safe and
sanitary;
(2) Dispose of all rubbish, garbage, and other waste in a clean, safe, and
sanitary manner;
(3) Keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by the tenant
as clean as their condition permits;
(4) Use and operate all electrical and plumbing fixtures properly;
(5) Comply with the requirements imposed on tenants by all applicable
state and local housing, health, and safety codes;
(6) Personally refrain, and forbid any other person who is on the premises
with his permission, from intentionally or negligently destroying, defacing, dam-
aging, or removing any fixture, appliance, or other part of the premises;
(7) Maintain in good working order and condition any range, refrigerator,
washer, dryer, dishwasher, or other appliances supplied by the landlord and
required to be maintained by the tenant under the terms and conditions of a writ-
ten rental agreement;
(8) Conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with his
consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his neighbors'
peaceful enjoyment of the premises.
(B) The tenant shall not unreasonably withhold consent for the landlord
to enter into the dwelling unit in order to inspect the premises, make ordinary,
necessary, or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations, or improvements, deliver
parcels which are too large for the tenant's mail facilities, supply necessary or
agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers,
mortgagees, tenants, workmen, or contractors.
(C) If the tenant violates any provision of this section, the landlord may
recover any actual damages which result from the violation together with reason-
able attorneys' fees. This remedy is in addition to any right of the landlord to
terminate the rental agreement, to maintain an action for the possession of the
premises, or injunctive relief to compel access under division (B) of this section.
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agreeing to convey premises "fit for the use intended by the parties"
and maintain them "in reasonable repair," and "in compliance with
the applicable health and safety laws."
Today there are over ten states in which courts have recognized
an implied covenant of habitability in leases.57 The Illinois Supreme
Court has recognized an implied covenant of habitability which would
be effectuated by "substantial compliance" with the relevant sections
of the Chicago building code.58 Those courts which have found a
covenant of habitability based on state or local health and building
regulations have usually held that such a warranty cannot be waived
by any provision in the lease,5 9 such waiver being illegal, void and
against public policy.60 However, where such attempted waiver of a
landlord's duty to maintain habitable conditions is not found to be
void it is to be strictly construed. 61 Such warranties apply to both
56 Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1974):
Subd. 1. In every lease or license of residential premises, whether in writing or
parol, the lessor or licensor covenants:
(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by the
parties.
(b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease or
license, except when the disrepair has been caused by the willful, malicious, or
irresponsible conduct of the lessee or licensee or a person under his direction or
control.
(c) To maintain the premises in compliance with the applicable health and
safety laws of the state and of the local units of government where the premises
are located during the term of the lease or license, except when violation of the
health and safety laws has been caused by the willful, malicious, or irresponsible
conduct of the lessee or licensee or a person under his direction or control.
The parties to the lease or license of residential premises may not waive or
modify covenants imposed by this section.
Subd. 2. The lessor or licensor may agree with the lessee or licensee that the lessee
or licensee is to perform specified repairs or maintenance, but only if the agree-
ment is supported by adequate consideration and set forth in a conspicuous
writing. No such agreement, however, may waive the provisions of Subd. 1 or
relieve the lessor or licensor of the duty to maintain common areas of the
premises.
Compare the preceding with Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A) (1) and (2) and 5321.13(A).
V California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Hawaii, New York, Ohio, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia. At least
five jurisdictions have expressly rejected the implied warranty of habitability for fitness for
purpose - Connecticut, Indiana, Tennessee, Texas and Washington. See Comment, Im-
plied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord- Tenant? 40
FORDHAM L. REV. 123 (1971).
5 Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); contra, Posnanski v.
Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
59 See, e.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973).
See also Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13(A).
60 Berger v. Downing, 1 CCH Pov L. REP. § 2210.22 (Boston Mun. Ct., App. Div. Mass.
1968). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18, Subd. 2, (West Supp. 1974) (this subdivision is
quoted supra note 56).
61 See Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 1014-15, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806, 807 (Super.
Ct. 1967), where a waiver by the tenant regarding her own apartment was strictly con-
strued and found not applicable to other parts of the building from which vermin infesta-




latent and patent defects under oral or written leases, for a specific
term or at will. As interpreted by the New Hampshire court in Kline
v. Burns,
62
[t]his means that at the inception of the rental there are
no latent (or patent) defects in facilities vital to the use of
the premises for residential purposes and that these essen-
tial facilities will remain during the entire term in a condi-
tion which makes the property livable.6 3
Furthermore, this warranty is an implied promise of continued com-
pliance with local housing laws throughout the lease term, keeping
the premises fit, safe and sanitary for living purposes. 4 It should be
noted that the tenant has a corresponding obligation under the con-
tract not to have willfully or negligently caused the defects com-
plained of.65 In addition, he must not only give the lessor adequate
notice of the defect, but also reasonable time to correct it before initi-
ating remedies."
The enactment of housing codes, however, is not by itself suffi-
cient to either prevent deterioration into slum conditions or bring
housing levels up to code standards. Generally, enforcement pro-
cedures rely on punishment of violators through fines which are less
costly than major repairs and therefore serve as a poor incentive
for landlords to undertake extensive repairs.67 Enforcement has also
often been inadequate, in part due to unwillingness of inspectors and
courts to impose financial burdens upon owners or to displace tenants
unable to afford decent housing.6 8 Consideration of the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is also
relevant when housing inspections are made. The Supreme Court has
upheld the area inspection seeking housing code violations under a
62 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); accord, Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526
(1970).
63 1d. at 92, 276 A.2d at 248.
"See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972). See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A)
(2).
61See Ohio Bill 103, §§ 5321.03(A) (2) and 5321.05(A) (6). See also Ohio Bill 103
§ 5321.09 (D).
"Id.; accord, Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972). See
Ohio Bill 103 §5321.07 (A) and (B). But note the exception of § 5321.07 (C).
67 Comment, IowA L. REV., supra note 13 at 656. Consider Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.08(D)
and 1923.15 establishing the basis for court costs, and the requirements imposed upon a
landlord under newly enacted § 5321.04 as well as the tenant's remedies generally under
§ 5321.07.
Note, HARV. L. REV., supra note 46 at 801-2. The development of slums was also hastened
by the restricted investment in existing housing and new construction during the Second
World War. See generally Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban
Society, 46 J. URBAN L. 695, 702 (1969). But consider the effect of Ohio Bill 103§ 5321.03 (A) (3), permitting a landlord to commence an action for possession under
Chapter 1923 of the Revised Code when compliance with applicable health and safety codes
would deprive the tenant of the use of the dwelling unit.
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valid search warrant if probable cause existed for its issuance. 69 The
reasonableness of obtaining a search warrant may depend on the
age and nature of the building, or on the condition of neighboring
areas, rather than on specific knowledge of defective conditions. 70
One Ohio case, Glyco v. Schultz, 71 has held that an existing
housing code is to be incorporated into the lease contract by implica-
tion, and that under such code the landlord has a legal duty to let
and maintain a substantially habitable dwelling.72 Failure to do so
would be a breach of contract for failure of consideration, entitling
the tenant to normal contract remedies. 73
Under Amended Substitute Senate Bill 103 of the State of Ohio
enacting Section 5321.04 of the Revised Code, the lessor will be
deemed to have warranted that the premises are and will be main-
tained in a fit and habitable condition and in compliance with the re-
quirements of all applicable building, housing, health, and safety
codes which materially affect health and safety.74
The primary concern of the legislature in this area, which should
also be among the foremost considerations of any responsible land-
lord, is with the health and safety of the tenant! 5 If the dwelling
unit fails to meet the requirements of local housing codes, and the
governmental agency inspecting the premises determines that such
failure materially affects the health or safety of the occupants, the
landlord will not only be in violation of the local ordinance, but also
of his obligations under the rental agreement imposed by the state.76
He must maintain the premises in a fit and habitable condition,7
with the housing codes providing one source of standards for deter-
mining whether or not the requisite fitness and habitability obliga-
tions have been met. Without high standards and vigorous enforce-
ment procedures, however, all the codes in the world will not improve
69 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
70 Id.
71 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972). As previously noted
the Cleveland Municipal Court has reached a similar conclusion. Lable & Co. v. Brooks,
Nos. B-89208 and B-89207 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. Ohio, August 20, 1974).
72 35 Ohio Misc. at 32, 289 N.E.2d at 925. In Lable & Co. v. Brooks, Nos. B-89208 and
B-89207 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. Ohio, August 20, 1974), Judge McManamon ruled that
"failure on the part of the landlord to maintain the premises in accordance with the Codi-
fied Ordinances of the City of Cleveland constitutes a breach of an implied warranty...
73 35 Ohio Misc. at 32-33, 289 N.E.2d at 925. Similarly, Judge McManamon held that the
tenant's covenant to pay rent and the landlord's covenant to maintain the premises in an
habitable condition were "for all purposes mutually dependent." Accordingly, the actions
for forcible entry and detainer, based upon nonpayment of rent, were dismissed upon proof
of housing violations. Lable & Co. v. Brooks, Nos. B-89208 and B-89207 (Cleveland Mun.
Ct. Ohio, August 20, 1974). See also Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.03(B) and 5321.12.
74See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A)(1) and (2).
IsSee note 61 supra.
76Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.04(A)(1) and 1923.15.




the lot of the tenant who may be forced to live in filth, squalor and
dilapidation merely because he cannot afford better or because his
landlord will not or cannot do anything about the conditions. Without
a showing of mutual respect for the interests and rights of all parties
concerned, and without a willingness to work toward the equally
beneficial goal of improving the condition of all residential rental
property to at least meet the minimum requirements of the applicable
housing codes, it is not likely that conditions will improve, in which
case it may fairly be said that the slum is here to stay.
At the heart of the solution is the need for housing codes which
are equitable and realistic. Inadequate standards will not resolve the
problem of improving the conditions often found in urban tenements.
Nor will excessive standards cure the ills which plague the mass
dwelling houses of the inner city, for in their vigor to find the
remedy, the housing officials may unwittingly become overzealously
oppressive, driving the landlord, overburdened by the excesses of an
unrealistically stringent housing code, right out of the market. The
solution, then, although easily stated and understandably more dif-
ficult to attain, is to set the standards of fitness and habitability at
such a level as to be economically feasible with respect to the land-
lord's ability to provide, while at the same time meeting the tenant's
reasonable needs to be provided with a safe and healthy shelter. While
the problem may be many-faceted (i.e., economic, political, social, and
environmental), the solution ultimately boils down to simple eco-
nomics. The landlord will only invest so much and the tenant can
only pay so much in return. The line establishing the criteria for
fitness and habitability, therefore, must be carefully drawn to accom-
modate the reasonable needs and abilities of both parties to the rental
agreement. When a condition is substantially dangerous to the health
and safety of an occupant, however, there should be no question where
such condition fits on the spectrum of obligations. It is the materialitv
of the condition which must be of concern, therefore, when one con-
siders the possible remedies which should be available for a breach
of the covenant of fitness and habitability.
Materiality of the Breach
In ascertaining whether a landlord has committed a breach of a
covenant of habitability, it is necessary to examine the nature of the
defects. Are they substantial enough to constitute a serious danger to
the safety and health of the inhabitants, 78 or are they mere amenities,
78See Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972).
See also Moskowitz, Rent Withholding and the Implied Warranty of Habitability- Some
New Breakthroughs, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 49 (1970). Note that Ohio Bill 103 and its
repeated references to conditions which "materially affect the health and safety" of occu-
pants in §§ 1923.02(H), 5321.02(A)11), 5321.04(A) (1), 5321.07(A), and 5321.11 as
evidence of the materiality of the breach required by the Ohio legislature to be shown in
order for the occupant to recover damages or secure compliance by the landlord with the
rental agreement or applicable building codes.
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unpleasant and unasthetic, perhaps, but not sufficiently serious to
establish the existence of a breach.7 9 To create a breach of covenant
justifying contractual or statutory remedies a housing code violation
must be serious enough to "render the premises uninhabitable in the
eyes of a reasonable person." 80 However, an inspection report cer-
tifying the existence of housing code violations which "may endanger,
or materially impair health or safety, and well-being of any tenant
therein or persons occupying said property" would certainly be
strong evidence of the landlord's constructive notice of a material
breach.81 Examples of "amenities" lacking the substantiality required
to satisfy the "uninhabitability" test are wall cracks, lack of paint,
malfunctioning blinds, shades or curtain rods, water leaks and so
forth.82 If the landlord expressly agreed in the lease to paint the
walls, for example, his failure to do so would entitle the tenant to
sue for breach of contract although the tenant would not be justified
in withholding rent for such an "amenity." 83 And even if a lessee
could accept the condition of the premises when conveyed and ex-
pressly agreed to make needed repairs except for wear and tear,
specifically relieving the landlord of any liability or responsibility for
repairs, 84 such waiver by the lessee has been found by a Louisiana
court not to extend to such material, structural defects as garage
waterproofing for which the lessor was held liable.8 5
An Iowa court in Mease v. Fox86 listed the following factors as
relevant to the determination of materiality: existence of housing
code violations ;87 seriousness of the deficiency or defect ;88 its effect
on safety and sanitation ;89 the length of time it has existed; the build-
ing's age; rental amount; the existence of a waiver or circumstances
for invoking an estoppel ;90 or any abnormal or malicious use by the
79Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 482, 268 A.2d 556, 558 (D.C.N.J.
1970).
80Berzito v. Gambino 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973); accord, Hinson v. Delis,
26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972).
s1 Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973). The severity
of defects "materially affecting the health and safety" of an occupant will have to be deter-
mined by a case by case evaluation in light of the actual notice requirements established by
Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07.
82 Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 482, 268 A.2d 556, 558 (D.C.N.J.
1970).
83 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.06, 5321.12 and 5321.13 (A) and (F).
84 Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.13 and 5321.14 specifically forbid such waivers and other "uncon-
scionable results."
Is Reed v. Classified Parking System, 232 So. 2d 103, 106-07 (La. App. 1970), based on LA.
CIV. CODE, arts. 2692, 2695 (1952).
86200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
87 See also Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A) (1).
88See also Ohio Bill 103 §§ 1923.02(H), 5321.02(A) (1), 5321.04(A) (1), 5321.07(A),
and 5321.11.
89 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A) (3).




tenant.9 1 In addition, the possibility of making the residence habit-
able within a reasonable time and the landlord's (or his agent's) re-
ceipt of notice of the breach are factors to be considered.92
In Ohio's Glyco v. Schultz,93 an underserviced electrical system,
faulty furnace, deteriorating stairs and a weak second floor were
found to be sufficiently material to constitute a breach by the land-
lord due to his repeated failure to repair them.9 4 While the Ohio
legislation keys in on building, housing, health and safety code re-
quirements to determine a standard of fitness and habitability, in
order to establish a prima facie breach it must be shown that any
violation materially affected the health and safety of the occupants.9 5
It is not enough that a local requirement has been violated to prove
a case of breach of the warranty of habitability, but it must also be
shown how such a violation affected the health and safety of the
occupants of the dwelling so as to be considered material as a matter
of fact. Failure to show that a violation of the housing codes mate-
rially affected the health and safety of the lessee-tenant may be fatal
in a cause of action alleging breach of landlord obligations.
While the housing code standard is employed throughout the
Ohio legislation, a closer scrutiny of the landlord's obligations and
the tenant's remedies under the Act provides further guidance in
determining the duties and correlative rights of the parties.9 6 Not
only must the lessor comply with the applicable housing codes, but
he also must "keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition," 97
with the lessee afforded relief for the landlord's non-compliance with
that provision,98 separate and apart from any violation of the housing
codes. It seems logical, however, that the same standards of mate-
riality would apply to the "fit and habitable condition" requirement
as with housing codes and, due to the vagueness of the former, the
91 Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa 1972); accord, Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr.
661 (1972). See also Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.05(A) (6) and 5321.09(D); Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 637 (1971).
"Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973). But see
Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07(A) and (B). Note the exception of § 5321.07(C).
9'35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972). In Lable & Co. v.
Brooks, Nos. B-89208 and B-89207 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. Ohio, August 20, 1974), violations
consisted of the "[ljack of door closings on exterior doors and lack of adequate and safe
electrical wiring
94 Id.
95 See note 48 supra.
96 While all the specific requirements of § 5321.04 will not be dealt with here in detail, it
should be noted that the broad language of sub-sections (A) (1) and (2) may be con-
sidered as encompassing the more specific requirements of the remaining landlord obliza-
tions detailed in subsections (A) (3) through (8).
'
7 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.04(A) (2).
"Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07(B).
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latter seems to be the better choice. In any event, the legislative intent
is clear. The landlord must provide a reasonably suitable shelter,
commensurate with the rent charged by him and paid by the tenant,
who now has available to him certain remedies, any one or combina-
tion of which may be called into play without first surrendering pos-
session of the premises, if the landlord fails to fulfill his statutorily
imposed obligations.
Remedies Available to the Tenant
Under the common law the tenant who signed a rental agree-
ment with full knowledge of patent defects was precluded from
remedies against the landlord for failure to let or maintain suitable
premises unless the landlord expressly covenanted to do so in the
agreement.' 9 However, the situation facing the indigent urban tenant
today presents compelling reasons for forbidding any such waiver.' ° °
The tenant is frequently compelled to negotiate from a position of
unequal bargaining power. For example, he often finds either racial
or class discrimination severely limiting the areas in which he may
seek housing, or an increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing
in areas receptive to his arrival.10 1 Moreover, he is often presented
with a lengthy standardized form lease reflecting a "take-it-or-leave-
it" situation.1 2 To allow a disadvantaged tenant to sign such a lease
for substandard housing is to endanger the health and safety not only
of the tenant and his family, but also of the nearby community.1 0 3
Assuming that the latent and patent defects are substantial
enough in nature to endanger the health and safety of the tenant and
that he is in no way responsible for their defective condition, the
99See, e.g., Whitehead v. Comstock & Co., 25 R.I. 423, 56 A. 446 (1903).
100 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13 (A), specifically provides that no provision of Chapter 5321 of
the Revised Code may be modified or waived by oral or written agreement except that a
landlord may assume any of the tenant's duties or obligations imposed by newly enacted
§ 5321.05.
101 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
1 2 Id. Such "boilerplate" agreements or contracts of adhesion containing clauses to confess
judgment, pay the landlord's attorney fees, limit his liability or indemnify him for his
losses are forbidden by Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13 (B), (C), (D), and (E); and § 5321.14
forbids unconscionable rental agreements or clauses and provides the courts with authority
to limit or refuse to enforce all or part of any such agreement or clause in order to avoid
an unconscionable result.
10 Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973). While the Senate version would
have excepted the lessee of "a single family residence under a tenancy of one year or more"
who would have been permitted to "agree to assume responsibility for the performance of
specified repairs, maintenance tasks, alterations, or remodeling of the rental premises" (S.B.
103 § 1923.21 (E) ) this provision was deleted in the compromise bill. With the shortage
of adequate housing meeting standards of habitability, allowance of such a waiver could
have constituted an unconscionable tool for the lessor in executing a rental agreement with
a desperate tenant, and is, therefore, not recommended. However, the provision forbidding
legal recognition of any rental agreement containing a limitation of liability clause favoring





tenant has several remedies available to him.104 The tenant, never-
theless, must, as a precondition to seeking any remedies, give timely
notice to the landlord of such defects, requesting their repair or re-
placement within a reasonable period of time. 105
The Ohio Legislature has recognized the need for statutory ten-
ant remedies by providing specific recourses available to the tenant
should the landlord breach his obligations under the rental agree-
ment or if housing code violations materially affecting the health and
safety of the tenant are found.106 Not only are the remedies for such
breach affirmatively established, but the Act also provides remedies
available to the tenant should the landlord in any way retaliate against
the tenant by increasing the rent, decreasing service, or threaten-
ing suit for possession for the tenant's assertion of his remedies for
breach of the landlord's obligations.107 Unfortunately, however, the
Ohio legislation fails to incorporate all possible tenant remedies, but
rather relies on only a few of the more common approaches which
appear to balance the equities in most cases, but which may not al-
ways be feasible or practical in others.
It should be clear, assuming a rental agreement is not found to
be unconscionable, that if the tenant is paying a "fair" price for a
reasonably suitable shelter (i.e., one he can afford) and if for some
reason the condition of such dwelling, through no fault of his own,
is permitted to deteriorate below the minimum acceptable standards
of fitness, habitability, health and safety, then according to the Bill,
the landlord will be required to bear the burden of making the needed
repairs1°8 The Bill does, however, protect the innocent landlord who
willingly undertakes to maintain the premises in a fit and habitable
condition by providing that these enumerated remedies are not avail-
able to the tenant who intentionally or negligently causes the damage
resulting in the unhabitable conditions complained of.109 A landlord
will not be subject to the remedies imposed by § 5321.07 of the new
legislation where he is the lessor of three or fewer dwelling units and
1o4 See generally Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07 (B). But note the exceptions of § 5321.07 (C).
105 Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal.
App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972). See Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.07(A) and
(B) and 5321.09(A) (2), which provide for the notice requirement and the "reasonable"
repair period, and the defense of the tenant's failure to give proper notice available to the
landlord in his application to the Clerk of Court for release of rent money paid into court
by the tenant under newly enacted § 5321.07 (B) (1).
1 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07.
107 Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.02 (A), 1923.15.
1
' Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.07, 1923.15.
109Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.05(A) (6) and 5321.09(D).
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gives written notice of such fact to the lessee. 110 Likewise, the tenant
remedies are not available to occupants of private college and uni-
versity dormitories."'
It must be noted that the primary objective of the legislation
appears to be the establishment and maintenance of some semblance
of equality between the parties to a rental agreement, not only at the
initial point of "bargaining" for the provisions to be contained in
the rental agreement, but also with respect to the rights and obliga-
tions under the agreement and imposed by statute during the lease
term. Neither party should be permitted to take undue advantage of
the other. The remedies outlined in the Ohio Bill hopefully will be
interpreted and applied in such a manner as to promote such equality
- a fair month's shelter for a fair month's rent.
Abandonment of the Premises by the Tenant (Constructive Eviction)
As noted earlier, the only remedy a tenant had under a standard
residential lease was to vacate the premises before withholding rent,
or, if there was a breach of an express covenant, to seek damages
for such breach.1 1 2 Today, if the tenant does abandon the premises,
where a material breach is present, the tenant's damages before
evacuation are measured by the difference between the fair market
value as warranted and the "as is" value.11 3 After vacating, however,
the condition of the premises is no longer relevant. The tenant, as-
suming he had an advantageous lease, has lost the "benefit of the
bargain" and may recover only the difference between the warranted
fair market value and the promised rent computed for that period.1
1 4
At present, if the tenant is in a jurisdiction where the courts or legis-
lature have recognized an implied covenant of habitability in a lease,
the tenant may withhold rent in a variety of methods without abandon-
ing the premises,11 5 thereby denying the landlord his rental payments
until he has brought the premises into substantial compliance with
the housing codes.116
It should appear obvious that abandonment of the premises and
withholding of rent under the theory of constructive eviction is not
a viable alternative in the arsenal of tenant remedies. For the dis-
advantaged lessee living at minimum subsistence level standards for
whatever reason, such a choice is simply impossible. For the more
110 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07 (C).
111 Id.
1 2 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.12.
3 Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972).
114 Id.
115 Quinn and Philips, Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guide-
lines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 228 (1969).




advantaged tenant, it is merely impractical and inconvenient. As a
result of this doctrine, the cards have long been stacked in favor of
the lessor and against the lessee. Now, however, the Ohio tenant need
not vacate the premises in order to contest the landlord's fulfillment
of his obligations.117 His remedy lies elsewhere, but he may be com-
forted by the fact that while he is asserting those statutory remedies
he will at least have a place to sleep.
A tenant may be forced to vacate the premises, returning pos-
session to the landlord, only in accordance with the applicable pro-
visions of Chapter 1923 of the Revised Code. 118 The lessor may not
threaten suit for possession in retaliation against the tenant for as-
serting his various rights under Chapter 5321.119 One possible situa-
tion which may result under the new Bill in the tenant's forced vaca-
tion of the dwelling unit would be when compliance by the landlord
with applicable health and safety codes would deprive the tenant of
the use of the dwelling unit, in which case the landlord may com-
mence an action for possession under Chapter 1923 in order that those
repairs can be made. 120 It appears, however, that not only would
the tenant under such circumstances recover damages for the land-
lord's violation of the rental agreement, 21 but it also seems that the
tenant should be able to recover possession upon repair of the un-
suitable condition should he so chose, although such option is not
specifically stated in the Bill.122
Withholding of Rent
In Amaniensis, Ltd. v. Brown,123 the court recognized three situ-
ations where tenants have valid defenses to eviction proceedings for
nonpayment of rent: the presence of substantial violations of hous-
ing codes affecting the habitability of the premises accompanied by
the landlord's lack of any bona fide remedial efforts; the ineffective
implementation of housing code enforcement procedures; and the in-
tentional neglect of the premises to force the tenant's abandonment. 124
If the landlord has in good faith begun repairing the premises, how-
ever, the tenant has an obligation to resume payment of rent.125 Mere
nonpayment by the tenant may render him vulnerable to an eviction
action necessitating a countersuit for damages in order to obtain any
117 Ohio Bill 103 §§ 1923.06(B), 1923.061(B), 1923.14, 5321.02 and 5321.03(B).
'T1 Note the applicable provisions to that Chapter which have been amended by Ohio Bill 103.
119 Ohio Bill 103 §§ 1923.06(B) and 5321.02.
120 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.03 (B).
121 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.02 (B) (2).
122 But see Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.02 (B) (2).
12365 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971).
124 Id. at 23, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 19. See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.03 (A) (3).
12s Riley v. Nelson, 256 S.C. 545, 183 S.E.2d 328 (1971).
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suitable relief. 126 Such a remedy is costly and time-consuming for the
indigent tenant and, therefore, somewhat unrealistic. 127 The Massa-
chusetts landlord-tenant legislation reflects current thinking and per-
mits the tenant to withhold rent without eviction for cited code viola-
tions not caused by the tenant provided such tenant gave timely notice
to the landlord.1 28
If the tenant ceases to pay rent, often the landlord will sue for
the rent or recovery of possession for its nonpayment, 129 in which
case the uninhabitability of the premises may be asserted as a defense
and set off by the tenant to such action.1 30 If the tenant sues the land-
lord to recover all or part of the rental payment or initial deposit,
the tenant will still be charged with the "reasonable rental value in
its imperfect condition during his period of occupancy,"1 3 that is,
the difference between the actual rental value of the premises in its
defective condition and the amount contracted for under the lease.
132
In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown,133 the court, acknowledging the
lack of expert testimony as to the reasonable value of the premises
and noting the lack of authority to cite in its acceptance of the per-
centage diminution approach, suggested the withholding of one-
126 See Ohio Bill 103 § 1923.06(B) in conjunction with §§ 1923.061(B) and 5321.03(A)
(1).
2 See Ohio Bill 103 §§ 1923.061 (B) and 5321.03 (A) (1). See also Ohio Bill 103 §
1923.06(B), advising of available legal assistance to the indigent tenant.
128 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, §8A (Cum. Supp. 1973):
There shall be no recovery under this chapter, pursuant to a notice to quit for
nonpayment of rent or where the tenancy has been terminated without fault of
the tenant, of any tenement or lot in a mobile home park rented or leased for
dwelling purposes if such premises are in violation of the standards of fitness for
human habitation established under the state sanitary code or any ordinance,
by-law, rule or regulation and if such violation may endanger or materially im-
pair the health or safety of persons occupying the premises; provided, however
1) that the person occupying the premises, while not in arrears in his rent, gave
notice in writing to the person to whom he customarily paid his rent (a) that he
would, because of such violation, withhold all rent thereafter becoming due until
the conditions constituting such violations were remedied and (b) that a report
of an inspection of such premises has been issued . . .2) that such violation was
not caused by the person occupying the premises or any other person acting under
his control ....
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-24 (1960). See also Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07.
19See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.03(A) (1).
130 E.g., Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973). See Ohio Bill 103 § 1923.061 (B).
131 Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.
2d 590, 597, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961). In lanacci v. Pendis, 64 Misc. 2d 178, 315
N.Y.S.2d 399 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970), the tenant was held entitled to the return of his
security deposit without ever having taken possession.
132E.g., Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972).
For example, the court allowed a 209 reduction in Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine,
67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971) and a 25% decrease in
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (D.C.N.J. 1970).




quarter of the accrued rent during the period of failure (lack of hot
water and heat), based upon guidelines in the Model Residential
Landlord-Tenant Code.'34
It seems reasonably certain that the Ohio legislature, in balanc-
ing the competing equities, has decided not to accord withholding
rent the stature it may or may not deserve by elevating it to the level
of a statutory remedy. The closest the new legislation comes to sanc-
tioning the "withholding" of rent is the provision enabling a com-
plaining tenant to apply to the court for a rent reduction, 35 which
should in turn trigger the court's inspection powers under Chapter
1923.136 Such a remedy, however, presupposes a willingness by the
court to violate the sacredness of the "freedom to contract" doctrine.
The court is more likely to assert its option under any order it issues
to require a rent deposit in lieu of reduction. 37 Such an order would
not overly burden the landlord who, willingly or as a result of the
court's direction, attempts to make the necessary repairs but requires
working capital, the source of which is the incoming rental payments,
to complete them. The rent withholding or reduction remedy de-
prives the lessor of the needed capital with which to accomplish
the task of repairing and reconditioning the property. It is not likely
that the court would opt for the withholding or reduction alternative
except in extreme circumstances, and then more in the form of a
"penalty" or "civil punishment" in order to achieve the desired results
of bringing the property within the minimum standards of fitness
and habitability, and only where it knows that the landlord can
financially bear the burden of such withholding or reduction and still
achieve the desired result. Subjective as it may seem, the legislature,
nevertheless, has provided for such a determination with respect to
the disposition of rents paid into court during the pendency of the
action.' 38 The fact remains, however, that the rent deposit is the
tenant's strongest and surest remedy.
134 Id. at 488, 268 A.2d at 561-62. Sec. 2-207(1) (b) of The Model Residential Landlord
Tenant Code which would permit the tenant to obtain substitute housing for the period
while the landlord remained liable for any additional expense up to one-half the amount of
the abated rent. It was suggested by one writer that any Model Code should include a pro-
vision rendering the landlord liable for moving costs if the continuation of the lease
violations resulted in the tenant's evacuation. See Note, Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code (Tent. Draft 1969), 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 647 (1973). The Model Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Code was the result of a 1968-69 research project of the American Bar Federa-
tion directed by Julian H. Levi of the University of Chicago. In 1970 a subcommittee of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, with Professor Levi as
reporter-draftsman, continued research which included circulation of four successive drafts
of a uniform act for comments by various representatives of the several interest groups.
Final approval of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act for submission to the
states was made at the annual meeting of the National Conference on Aug. 10, 1972. Copies
may be obtained by writing 645 North Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60611.
13 5 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07 (B) (2).
136 Ohio Bill 103 § 1923.15.
137 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07 (B) (2).
138 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.10.
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Escrow Arrangement (Rent Strike)
In order to ensure against an eviction judgment for wrongful
withholding of rent, the tenant may prefer an escrow arrangement,
sometimes called a "rent strike," whereby rental payments are de-
posited with a third party, as for example, a clerk of court, 139 or a
credit union fund, 140 to remain in escrow until the landlord has made
the necessary repairs. Under this theory the landlord's right to the
money in escrow is conditioned upon his bringing the premises into
compliance with housing code standards.1 41 A statutory example of
the escrow method currently employed in other jurisdictions, is the
Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act, applicable when a dwelling has
been certified as unfit for human habitation, and setting a six month
limit to the escrow period after which the money is to be returned
to the tenant if the necessary improvements have not been made. 42
In DePaul v. Kaufman,'4 the court upheld the Pennsylvania Act
against a charge of unconstitutional vagueness by saying that stand-
ards encompassed within the phrase "unfit for human habitation"
were defined by § 7-506 of the Philadelphia Housing Code.'4 Con-
tractual obligations protected by the Constitution are "necessarily
subject to the police power," therefore a statute furthering a legiti-
mate purpose (such as the improvement of housing conditions) will
139 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 11 § 127F (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 42-85
(Supp. 1974). See also Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07(B) (1).
140 Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
141 See Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.08, 5321.09 and 5321.10.
142 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Cum. Supp. 1974):
[DIuring any period when the duty to pay rent is suspended, and the tenant
continues to occupy the dwelling, the rent withheld shall be deposited by the
tenant in an escrow account in a bank or trust company . . . and shall be paid
to the landlord when the dwelling is certified as fit for human habitation at any
time within six months from the date on which the dwelling was certified as unfit
for human habitation. If, at the end of six months . .. such dwelling has not been
certified as fit for human habitation, any moneys deposited in escrow on account
of continued occupancy shall be payable to the depositor except that any funds
deposited in escrow may be used for the purpose of making such dwelling fit
for human habitation and for the payment of utility services for which the land-
lord is obligated but which he refuses or is unable to pay. No tenant shall be
evicted for any reason whatever while rent is deposited in escrow.
See Clough, Pennsylvania's Rent Withholding Law, 73 DICK. L. REv. 583 (1969); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 441.570-80 (Supp. 1974). The Ohio Bill is weak in the effectiveness of
this remedy since an escrow deposit is not available as a remedy against a lessor of three
or fewer dwelling units or to private college and university dormitories under § 5321.07
(C). An escrow deposit may be available for these latter situated tenants but only after a
hearing, Ohio Bill 103 §§ 1923.061 and 1923.15. Since the tenants of a large apartment
building may have more strength by sheer numbers to organize against a landlord, it is the
single tenant, and small groups of tenants who need the most protection.
143441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971).
144 Id. at 393, 272 A.2d at 502. See Note, DePaul v. Kauffman: The Pennsylvania Rent With-




be upheld although it interferes with existing contract rights.145 The
original six month escrow limitation period can be extended at the
tenant's option if the landlord is endeavoring to comply. 14
The New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law,
authorizing payments to the clerk of court, would allow the deposited
moneys, at the court's discretion, to be used to make the repairs, any
balance to be turned over to the landlord with a "complete account-
ing of the rents deposited and the costs incurred." 147 A variation of
the rent strike is illustrated by New York's Spiegel Law, authorizing
the Public Welfare Department to withhold the rental payments of
welfare recipients while the premises contain serious housing code
violations.148
Without doubt, the rent deposit remedy is the Ohio tenant's great-
est weapon in the struggle for adequate housing conditions. While
no financial benefit inures to the tenant as it would through the non-
payment or reduction of his periodic rental amount, the legislature
has firmly come down in favor of letting the landlord know of any
deficiency in fulfilling his obligations. Once the rent is deposited with
the court after proper notice to the landlord of the non-compliance
and subsequent failure to remedy the condition within a reasonable
time,149 the lessor must then bring the premises up to the statutorily
established standards or forfeit the rent.15 0 And lest one think that
such remedy is oppressive or at least unreasonable, the legislature
has provided for the release of enough of the rent deposit for the
landlord to cover the customary and usual costs of operating the
premises as a rental unit.151 The landlord will be required, however,
to forego receipt of the profit as the price of maintaining a fit and
habitable, safe and healthy dwelling place for the tenants, but for
whom no profit could exist.
The Bill has incorporated ample protection for the interests of
both parties to the agreement, yet the legislative intent remains clear
-neither party should be placed in a position, by the courts or
14SId. at 399, 272 A.2d at 506. See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.06 allowing landlords and tenants
to agree to anything in their rental agreements not inconsistent with the requirements im-
posed by the newly enacted Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code or any other applicable rule
of law.
14 Klein v. Allegheny County Health Dept., 441 Pa. 1, 269 A.2d 647 (1970).
14 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.10.
148 N.Y. Soc. SEv. LAW § 143-b (McKinney 1966); the constitutionality of this law author-
izing rent abatement for welfare recipients was upheld in Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486,
227 N.E.2d 824, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971). See Simmons, Passion and Prejudice: Rent
Withholding Under New York's Spiegel Law, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 572 (1969). See also
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23 § 11-23 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1974), authorizing a welfare
agency to withhold rent allowance from the recipient or directly from the landlord if the
recipient was living in premises violating housing codes, and prohibiting retaliatory eviction.
149 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07.
u10 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.09.
1" Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.10.
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otherwise, to take undue advantage of the other. That the landlord
has an obligation to provide a dwelling unit in suitable condition as
one part of the bargain is evident. That the tenant's part of the
agreement is to pay a fair price commensurate with what is received
is also a sound principle. But when a disadvantaged lessee who is
barely able to meet the periodic rental obligations is forced to stand
by and watch the very habitation which was contracted for deteri-
orate due to a lack of concern on the part of the landlord then the
only alternative remaining for the tenant is to deposit the rent with
a party who will ensure that at least an effort is made to maintain
the property in a suitable condition for human habitation. In Ohio,
that party has been determined to be the courts, and hopefully now
the tenant will find the relief he was unable to gain or could not
afford in the past.
Repair and Deduction
Where the landlord is unwilling or unable to properly maintain
the premises, another option for the tenant, provided he can afford
it, is to make the necessary repairs himself and deduct their cost
from his next rental payment. 152 For example, in Marini v. Ireland,53
the court sanctioned repairs by the tenant at the landlord's expense
of "vital facilities" if "reasonable in the light of the value of the
leasehold" subsequent to timely notice.1 54 In Garcia v. Freeland
Realty,155 the court allowed reimbursement for repairs made where it
was reasonably foreseeable that injury from lead poisoning would
occur due to the landlord's repeated refusal to paint the premises. 56
The court reasoned that where there was a threat to the safety of
children and a housing shortage limiting the tenant's options, the
prevention of an injury, for which the landlord could be liable in a tort
action for negligence, warranted reimbursement of costs for such
preventable repairs.157
Some landlords purposely make the tenant's notice requirement
difficult to fulfill.15 8 In one extreme example, all complaints, even those
concerning vital services, and all rental payments had to be sent
15 2 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07(B) (2), authorizing the tenant to apply to the court "for an
order to use the rent deposited to remedy the condition."
15356 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
'S4Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 535.
15563 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970).
1561d. at 941-42, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 220-22.
117 Id. See Note, Housing Codes and a Tort of Slumlordism, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 522 (1971).
158 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.18 requiring the landlord to give written notice in the rental
agreement or otherwise of his or his agent's name and address to the tenant and providing
that in the absence of such notice to the tenant, the landlord will be deemed to have waived




through the mail to a post office box listed under an assumed name.1 59
The court upheld informational picketing outside the landlord's resi-
dence as a reasonable means of effectively protesting his manner of
house-lettin. 16 0
The California statutes sanction this combined tenant remedy of
repair and deduction where the landlord has failed to respond or com-
ply within a reasonable time (thirty days) after notice.1 61 However,
the statute not only limits its use to once in any twelve month period,
but also permits repair expenditures under this method not to exceed
more than the amount of one month's rent. Although public policy
forbids the tenant's waiver of statutory rights with respect to any
condition which would render the premises untenantable,1 62 the land-
lord and tenant may provide for the tenant's undertaking certain im-
provements, repairs and maintenance of all or stipulated portions of
the dwelling as partial consideration for the rental.1 63 The parties may
also agree in writing to arbitration of the controversy relating to a
claimed untenantable condition.1 6
4
The Ohio Legislature has provided that the tenant may apply
to the court for an order allowing the use of rent deposited with the
clerk to remedy the condition complained of.165 Assuming the court
grants the application after a finding that the condition is one which
is included within the landlord's statutory obligations or the housing
code requirements, the tenant may then have the repairs made and
deduct from the periodic rent an amount equal to such cost. However,
several problems are immediately apparent. First, if the dwelling
unit is in such poor condition as to materially affect the health and
safety of its inhabitants or to be considered unfit and uninhabitable,
it is not likely that the repair and deduction remedy will be very
successful, for the cost of upgrading such a structure to meet only
the minimum standards required may very well be staggering and
unattainable by the average tenant, let alone the disadvantaged one.
Further, the landlord may reasonably contend that the conditions
159 Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to Rejuvenate Tenant Housing, 433 Pa. 578, 252
A.2d 622 (1969).
160 Id.
161 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1954).
112 See also Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13(A).
163 Presumably, such agreements would be upheld by a court under Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.06,
unless found to be "unconscionable" under § 5321.14 or otherwise in contravention of legis-
lative intent or the tenant's statutory rights under Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code.
164 Other statutes authorizing repairs and deductions are LA. Civ. CODE art. 2694 (1952) and
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 42-201-202 (1947). Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 61-111-112
(1966) requiring the landlord to repair premises, making him liable for substantial im-
provements made by the tenant with his consent and for all damages resulting from failure
to repair.
6
'Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.07(B) (2).
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which the tenant seeks to have repaired and deducted are not material
or are not such as to render the premises unfit and uninhabitable, and
although the remedy is not available without court order, it would
require the court to evaluate each condition in order to determine
materiality prior to deciding whether or not to issue an order granting
the repair and deduction. 166 And finally, even if the court issues such
an order, there is no corresponding obligation for the tenant to have
the repairs completed at the best available price. Does the tenant
have any obligation to minimize the cost of repairs? May he do the
work himself and deduct the cost of the materials supplied as well as
the value of his labor? And, what voice, if any, does the landlord
have in the whole matter of repair and deduction? The argument, of
course, will be made that the landlord has forfeited or waived the
right to protest if the condition is not remedied after proper notice of
its existence followed by a reasonable time to correct. But what about
the honest dispute of fact over the materiality of the breach of the
landlord's (or tenant's, for that matter) statutory obligation which is
bound to occur and will probably predominate in this area?
Because of the problems posed above and others not so evident,
it does not appear likely that the courts will automatically employ the
repair and deduct remedy. More likely, as has already been pointed
out, the courts will resort to the rent deposit approach, leaving the
burden on the landlord to repair the premises as a precondition to the
receipt of the rent. 67 An alternative approach to either of these
remedies is to place the premises in the hands of an independent and
disinterested third party who has no obligation to landlord or tenant.
The objective of improving the condition of substandard housing may
thereby be more effectively met particularly in the inner city where
the cost of repairing the premises and rehabilitating the area may
be totally prohibitive to both landlord and tenant.
Appointment of a Receiver
Some jurisdictions, notably New York and Illinois, have enacted
receivership laws which generally authorize a designated municipal
agency or private individual to initiate proceedings appointing a re-
ceiver after the landlord's failure to repair housing code violations.
68
166 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.09(A) (3).
167 See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.09(A) (1).
168 Special Project, Developments in Contemporary Landlord-T&nant Law: An Annotated
Bibliography, 26 VAND. L. REv. 689, 750 (1973). One New York receivership law, N.Y.
MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1972) was held constitutional in In re Dept.
of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964). N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTIONS LAW, § 778 (McKinney Supp. 1973) is illustrative of a specific authorization
for a receiver:
1. The court is authorized and empowered . . . to appoint a person other than
the owner, a mortgagee or lienor, to administer the rent moneys or security de-
posited with the clerk subject to the court's direction. Such person shall be an




While the New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
is a good example of a specific authorization, the Illinois statute
gives the municipality broad powers to apply for an injunction re-
quiring compliance with local housing ordinances or for "such other
order as the court may deem necessary or appropriate to secure such
compliance." 169 Thus, Illinois courts have upheld the appointment of
a receiver as an appropriate exercise of this broad equity power in the
public interest.1 70 A city in one case sought to allow the receiver to
issue notes or certificates authorized under the Illinois Municipal Code
if the rental was insufficient to accomplish the necessary repairs.17 1 In
addition, the city requested that purchasers of such certificates be con-
sidered holders of first liens on the premises superior to others except
for the payment of taxes. 172 The court upheld the constitutionality of
this interference with the contractual rights of mortgagees as a rea-
sonable exercise of the police power to promote the marketability of
the certificates, and to make rehabilitation more feasible. 173
The receivership laws, however, have not been entirely success-
ful. Receivers willing to invest the necessary funds are hard to locate;
the selection of appropriate buildings for rehabilitation, rather than
demolition, is difficult; and the entire procedure is time consuming. 74
One possible solution to these problems is to have the municipality
itself assume the role of a receiver, but repairs are often more costly
(Continued from preceding page)
attorney and counsellor at law duly qualified to practice law in this state or a
certified public accountant or a real estate broker licensed in this state. Such
administrator is authorized and empowered in accordance with the direction of
the court, to order the necessary materials, labor and services to remove or remedy
the conditions specified . . . and to make disbursements in payment thereof.
Such administrator, shall, upon completion of the work prescribed ... file with
the court a full accounting of all receipts and expenditures for such work.
2. The court may allow from the rent moneys or security on deposit a reasonable
amount for the services of such administrator.
3. The administrator so appointed shall furnish a bond, the amount and form of
which shall be approved by the court. The cost of such bond shall be paid from
the moneys so deposited.
The newly enacted Ohio legislation does not specifically treat the possibility of receiver-
ships. § 5321.19 would prohibit any Municipal Corporation from enacting any ordinance
in conflict with Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code, or that would regulate the rights or
obligations of parties to any rental agreements covered by the provisions of Chapter 5321.
169 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-31-2 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1974).
170 Community Renewal v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 44 Ill.2d 284, 291, 255 N.E.2d 908,
913 (1970).
171 Id.
Mid.; accord, Oyola v. Combo Creditors, 64 Misc. 2d 727, 315 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1970).
173 Community Renewal v. Chicago Tide & Trust Co., 44 Ill. 2d 284, 293, 255 N.E.2d 908,
913 (1970).
174 Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 828-29 (1965).
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for a municipality (as opposed to private receiver) and the lim-
ited availability of municipal funds frequently impedes substantial
progress.17 5
The new Ohio legislation is mute on the subject of receiverships.
One section, however, provides that municipal corporations may not
enact or enforce any local ordinance in conflict with the objectives of
the new Chapter 5321 or which attempt to regulate the rights of parties
to a rental agreement encompassed within that chapter.176
The appointment of a receiver, private or governmental, however,
to deteriorated urban housing areas, and cloaking such receiver with
the attendant obligations imposed upon a landlord under Chapter
5321 of the Revised Code, seems to be an attractive possibility. More-
over, by providing tax benefits for the investment of capital in such
enterprises, such as those available for the purchase of municipal
bonds, the necessary funds could be made available to make substan-
tial progress toward the rejuvenation of our urban slum areas. While
no firm answer to the receivership question is yet available, it seems
almost inevitable that such a remedy, although not one directly avail-
able to the tenant, might be utilized more in the future if legisla-
tures decide to seek new and imaginative solutions to poor housing
conditions.
Tenant Unions
Recently tenant unions, similar to neighborhood associations and
special interest groups, have had some success in gaining compliance
with housing codes, usually with local building departments initiating
the court proceedings. 17 In Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty
Equities Corp.,178 however, the tenant union itself was allowed to bring
suit in the nature of a class action since the issues involved only mat-
ters of common interest rather than individual tenant complaints;
and also, the tenant association balanced the bargaining power be-
tween the landlord and the tenants. 79
A Massachusetts statute explicitly recognizes the right of such
tenant groups to be heard:
A housing authority or its designee shall meet at reasonable
times with tenant organizations to confer about complaints
and grievances; provided, that if there is more than one
tenant organization in any housing project, said authority
175 Id. at 829.
176 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.19.
177 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. 2235, at 3222 (1972).
178 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971).




or its designee shall not be obliged to meet with more than
two organizations in each project which represent, as the
housing authority may determine, the largest number of
tenants in that project. The housing authority shall inform
the tenant organizations of its decisions on any matters
presented.1 80
Other states have given the tenant statutory protection from any
retaliation by the landlord for tenant initiatives in reporting to a
municipal authority health or building code violations. 181
The new Ohio legislation makes only one obscure reference to the
use of tenant groups to balance the bargaining position of the dis-
advantaged tenant with that of the landlord. Under the Ohio Bill the
lessor may not retaliate against the lessee if the tenant joins with
others to collectively deal with the landlord.182 Nowhere, however, does
it specifically provide that a tenant group may file an action or protest
the inaction of the landlord in the name of the group, although it
seems obvious that the effect on the court would be the same whether
a group of tenants complained as individuals or as an organized unit.
The effect of the union remedy is probably greater in the dealings
between the tenants and their landlord than with the courts, for it is
in the direct, personal negotiations over leases, repairs, and so forth
between the two parties that the tenant union can provide the clout
necessary to maintain a respectable bargaining position. In the past,
however, tenants have negotiated in groups with the specter of re-
taliation constantly before them. Now, however, there should be no
reason why tenant groups cannot flex the same economic muscle
as do the landlords. The disparity, however, still remains between
the relative economic strengths of the opposing groups. It is not
likely, therefore, that tenant unions will go far economically in re-
solving the plight of their members without first having attained
the cooperation of the landlords and the courts.
Invalidation of the Rental Agreement (Rescission)
The origin of one further tenant remedy is based upon the com-
mon law contract theories of rescission, which restores the parties to
the status quo ante the lease, or illegality which renders the contract
1 MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 121, § 43 (1968). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (West
Supp. 1974).
181 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974). Although the Ohio Bill forbids
eviction or rental increase by the landlord in retaliation against a complaining tenant, it is
silent as to the method of proving retaliation, as opposed to legitimate increases reflecting
higher operating costs. See also Ohio Bill 103 § 1923.06(B) and § 5321.02(A), prohibit-
ing retaliation by the landlord against a tenant.
l Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.02(A) (3).
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void ab initio.783 An oft-cited case, Brown v. Southall Realty,184 held
that where violations of a housing code exist at the inception of the
lease agreement, a lease of such premises, forbidden under the District
of Columbia Housing Regulations was void, 185 reflecting the theory
that a contract violating laws enacted in the public interest bestows
no enforceable rights on the parties to the contract. 186 An exception
applies where one party is ignorant of the statutory prohibition de-
signed primarily to protect such party, or where an unequal bargain-
ing position necessitates acquiescence. In such a situation the wronged
party is not in pari delicto and not precluded from recovering damages
if he should elect cancellation of the lease rather than a form of rent
withholding, for example, as his remedy. 187
The Brown illegality was not based solely on the existence of code
violations, since "minor" violations would not have invalidated the
lease, but rather on the effect of such violations on the purpose of the
regulations to prohibit the letting of uninhabitable premises. 88 Void-
ing the lease, rather than warranting automatic rescission and evic-
tion of the tenant, merely precludes either party from enforcing its
covenants through the medium of the courts.189 If the lease is void,
the tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance thereby allowing the land-
lord to terminate the relationship after reasonable notice, since a
landlord cannot be compelled to rent his property. 19 Of course, under
this theory the tenant has the option of rescinding the contract after
giving the landlord proper notice. Although the landlord is not en-
183 Although the recently enacted Ohio Landlord-Tenant legislation does not specifically pro-
vide for rescission or invalidation of the lease by the parties, § 5321.07 (B) (3) permits
the tenant to terminate the rental agreement as a remedy to the landlord's failure to fulfill
his obligations under § 5321.04. The same remedy is likewise available to the landlord
under § 5321.11 when the tenant fails to remedy conditions caused by him under § 5321.05.
The courts, moreover, may refuse to enforce all or part or in any manner limit the ap-
plicability of any section of an agreement under its powers in § 5321.14.
1-4237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
18s Id. at 837. D.C. Housing Regs. § 2301 states that no owner, licensee, or tenant shall occupy
or permit the occupancy of any habitation in violation of these regulations, accord, Longe-
recke v. Hardin, 130 Il. App. 2d 468, 264 N.E.2d 878 (1970).
1'8 See Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972).
1871d. at 51, 289 N.E.2d at 934; accord, Stevens v. Berger, 255 Wis. 55, 37 N.W.2d 841
(1949).
88Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
189Id. at 495; accord, Reed v. Classified Parking System, 232 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1970),
where the court, interpreting LA. CIV. CODE art. 2729 (Slovenko 1961), found that in
order for a tenant to seek dissolution of a lease based on the landlord's failure to fulfill
his obligations under the lease, he had to prove his possession substantially disturbed and
the premises no longer fit for the purpose for which leased. In this latter case, the cancel-




titled to rental payments under a void lease, the tenant at suffierance
is liable for the reasonable value of the premises during the period of
occupancy. 19 1
Ohio's only reference to the invalidation of a lease in its recently
enacted landlord-tenant legislation is to the authority of the court to
make a determination that a rental agreement or specific clause
therein is unconscionable. The court may refuse to enforce all or any
part of the agreement or limit its provisions in any manner so as to
avoid an unconscionable result. 192
Likewise, while a landlord and tenant may agree to anything in
their lease not contrary to the rights and obligations of each imposed
by Chapter 5321 of the Revised Code, 193 there are specific prohibitions
incorporated into that chapter which in the past have been notorious
for weakening the contractural position of the tenant to the advantage
of the landlord. Such provisions as enumerated in the statute are
strictly forbidden and if found in the rental agreement will be deemed
to be unlawful, 94 thereby rendering the lease either void ab initio or
unenforceable due to its overreaching nature. At any rate, those pro-
visions specifically prohibited by statute will be stricken and their
inclusion may be considered in the court's determination of unconscion-
ability with respect to the remaining parts of the rental agreement.
Conclusion
As has been illustrated, substantial inroads have been made into
the traditional independent covenant theory of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships both in statutory law and court decisions. In modern urban
America, the many reasons favoring equalizing the landlord-tenant
relationship seem persuasive and the trend towards that objective
seems unmistakably clear.
Nevertheless, from the landlord's viewpoint, holding him to high
standards of habitability is not without attendant risks. If the land-
lord must make costly repairs in a limited amount of time, while
simultaneously paying off the mortgage, and is deprived of his rental
payments during the period, he may opt or be forced to abandon the
properties.795 Or, to redeem the amounts spent on repairs and interest
191 William J. Davis, Inc. v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412, 416 (D.C. App. 1970). A Maine statute
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (Supp. 1972), authorizes the rescission of the rental
contract and proportional recovery of rents.
lnOhio Bill 103 § 5321.14.
'9 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.06.
19 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.13.
195 Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 343, 291 A.2d 580, 583 (App. Div. 1972).
See Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.10 (A) which permits a court to release enough of the deposited
rent to cover mortgage principle and interest, taxes, insurance, utilities, repairs and other
customary costs of operating the premises as a rental unit. Such discretion would enable a
court to ensure that a landlord who endeavors to correct the conditions complained of by
the tenant does not experience unnecessary financial hardship beyond the cost of necessary
repairs.
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charges, if borrowing was necessary, the landlord may have to raise
rents, resulting in even fewer adequate low-income housing units in
urban areas already facing serious shortages.196 Stringent mainte-
nance standards could force a small landlord into financial bank-
ruptcy 97 or discourage investors from venturing into the housing
market.198
Even a cooperative landlord may require aid to meet his obliga-
tions. He may need helpful advice from housing inspectors concerning
the extent of damage and immediacy of needed repairs, and the ob-
taining of reasonable estimates and reliable workmen. 1" In addition,
agency financial advisors should provide aid for qualifying the pro-
spective landlord for Federal Housing Administration mortgage guar-
anties, and perhaps readjusting the landlord's debt structure to lower
his mortgage payments and lessen the amount of debt financing.200
Although the damage resulting from willfully destructive acts by
the tenant or his family are usually readily distinguishable from that
caused by the ravages of age and neglect,20 1 there may be some defects
the source of which is difficult to determine; as is the proper remedy.
To allow the landlord, under the watchful eye of the court, to use the
deposited escrow funds for the required repairs would appear to be
an equitable compromise. 202 In Levengard v. District of Columbia,20 3
the court answered such landlord arguments this way:
[Olne who chooses to use his property as a dwelling place
for others to produce profit for himself cannot avoid compli-
ance with the safety standards properly established for such
use merely because it is expensive or difficult.2 04
In other words, the court was implying that "if you can't take the
heat, get out of the kitchen !"
196 Id. Compare Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.02 (A) with § 5321.02 (C), wherein the landlord, pro-
hibited from increasing the tenant's rent in retaliation against some tenant action, is enabled
to "increase the rent to reflect the cost of improvements installed by the landlord in or
about the premises or to reflect the increase in other costs of operation of the premises."
197 RUTGERS L. REV., supra note 134 at 655.
" Snook, Real Estate Interests Fight Tough Tenant Bill for Ohio, The Plain Dealer (Cleve-
land), January 21, 1974, at 1A col. 5. The Ohio Bill gives more than adequate attention to
protecting the landlord, spelling out the duties and obligations of the lessee with equal
specificity as those of the lessor. See Ohio Bill 103 §§ 5321.04 and 5321.05.
'"Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 858 (1965).
m Id.
201 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.05 (A) (6) requires the tenant to refrain from "intentionally or neg-
ligently" damaging the premises.
202 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.10(A) provides for the release of rent deposits by the court for the
purpose of making required repairs.
203 254 A.2d 728 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).




Since Ohio's case law equalizing the landlord-tenant relationship
is virtually non-existent, without the enthusiastic enforcement of the
new landlord-tenant legislation the tenant's hopes for fair and equal
treatment will lie in a sympathetic court or jury unshackled by
tradition. An example of the importance of obtaining statutory
remedies and standards is illustrated by a recent Louisiana case in
which the court limited the tenant's damages for a landlord's failure
to provide property fit for living purposes to damages for "emotional
discomfort, loss of convenience, humiliation. '20 5 The tenant was de-
nied an injunction restraining the landlord from eviction proceed-
ings because there was no legal basis for one. 20 6 Furthermore, the
court found there was no law empowering the court to order sub-
standard housing repaired to meet code standards, so the tenant was
denied a judgment against the landlord ordering such repairs.20 7
Without such legislation, too many courts will find a rationale
for their decisions in stare decisis, caveat emptor, "freedom of con-
tract," and other common law concepts rooted in our history, rather
than explore the challenges and face the realities of the present. If
the low-income tenant is ever to find a "place in the sun" in Ohio,
the courts now must listen to, and heed, the philosophy of Justice
Cardozo:
A rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts them-
selves, and was supposed in the making to express the mores
of the day, may be abrogated by courts when the mores have
so changed that perpetuation of the rule would do violence
to the social conscience .... This is not usurpation. It is not
even innovation. It is the reservation for ourselves of the
same power of creation that built up the common law through
its exercise by the judges of the past.2 0 8
How soon the effects of the new Ohio law will be felt by both
landlord and tenants depends in part on whether the legislation is
given retroactive, or merely prospective application. That is, are
tenants and landlords whose leases were executed prior to the effec-
tive date of the law, but still continuing after such date, auto-
matically bound by the obligations, and entitled to the remedies enun-
ciated in the new Act? For example, where tenant damage to prop-
205 Evans v. Doll Brothers Realty, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. § 18, 196 (Ct. App. La. 1973).
206 Id.
207 Id. Ohio Bill 103 § 1923.15 gives the court such authority by providing that:
the court may order an appropriate government agency to inspect the residential
premises. If the agency determines and the court finds conditions which consti-
tute a violation of § 5321.04 [landlord duties and obligations], and ... if the
court finds that the tenant may remain in possession, the court may order such
conditions corrected.
208 CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 136 (1927), cited in Jack Spring Inc. v. Little, 50
Ill. 2d 351, 367, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972).
1974]
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
erty occurred prior to the Act, will the reasonably high standard of
"materially affecting the health and safety" be necessary to warrant
an eviction proceeding subsequent to the effective date?209 Again,
is the notice requirement of § 5321.11 necessary concerning a subse-
quent eviction proceeding for a prior breach of tenant obligations? 210
Although § 28 of Art. II of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the
Ohio General Assembly from passing retroactive laws, courts have
generally applied this limitation only to laws affecting substantive
rights in contrast to laws remedial in nature.2 1  Remedial laws are
generally procedural, providing "rules of practice, courses of proce-
dure, or methods of review. ' 212 In a broader sense, the term "remedial"
connotes the means utilized to enforce a right or redress wrongs and
abuses.2 13 Remedies are concerned with the methods by which exist-
ing rights are recognized, guarded and enforced, rather than with
the substantive rights themselves.2 1 4 A remedial law should be liberally
construed so as to most effectively accomplish the remedial purposes
intended.2 1 5
A substantive statute creating or interferring with vested rights
or imposing new obligations concerning past transactions and rela-
tionships would forbid any retroactive application under this pro-
hibition.2 16 But the new Ohio Law, it could be argued, rather than
impairing substantive rights, merely clarifies and delineates existing
duties and obligations initiating only new procedures or remedies for
their enforcement.2 17 There is no vested right in a specific remedy.
The obligations of landlords were previously created with the pas-
219Ohio Bill 103 §§ 1923.02 (H), 5321.11.
210 Ohio Bill 103 § 5321.05.
211 Payne v. Keller, 18 Ohio App. 2d 66, 68-69, 247 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1969); State v.
Morse, 165 Ohio St. 599, 604, 139 N.E.2d 660, 664 (1956). See also Kacian v. Illes Con-
struction Co., 24 Ohio App. 2d 43, 263 N.E.2d 680 (1970).
212 Kilbreath v. Reedy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 72, 242 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1969); State v. Morse,
165 Ohio St. 599, 605, 139 N.E.2d 660, 664 (1956); 'Payne v. Keller, 18 Ohio App. 2d
66, 69, 247 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1969). See also State v. Industrial Comm., 11 Ohio St. 2d
175, 179, 228 N.E.2d 621, 623 (1967).
213O'Hara v. Alberto-Culver Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 132, 215 N.E.2d 735, 737 (1966).
214 10 0. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 568 (1954); See State v. Industrial Comm., 11 Ohio
St. 2d 175, 179, 228 N.E.2d 621, 623 (1967).
21s In re Clark (Prob), 74 Ohio L. Abs. 460, 141 N.E.2d 259 (P. Ct.), aff'd 102 Ohio App.
200, 141 N.E.2d 890 (1956); Mercer v. Jones, 18 Ohio App. 2d 57, 61, 246 N.E.2d 583,
586 (1968). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (Page 1969).
216E.g., Perk v. City of Euclid, 17 Ohio St. 2d 4, 8, 244 N.E.2d 475, 477 (1969); State v.
Industrial Comm., 11 Ohio St. 2d 175, 179, 228 N.E.2d 621, 623 (1967). General Indus-
tries v. Jones, 89 Ohio App. 43, 100 N.E.2d 703 (1951).
217 See Bagsarean v. Parker Metal Co., 282 F. Supp. 766, 769 (N.D. Ohio 1968), citing




sage of housing codes. The procedural remedy of rent withholding has
merely been created to provide the tenant with a means of enforcing
the landlord's duties.
If this new Act is to be remedial, then the retroactive applica-
tion of its provisions to existing leases and security deposits would
be entirely consistent with the Ohio Constitution as it has been inter-
preted by the courts. Such retroactivity would provide the tenant to-
day with the means of obtaining a habitable place to live tomorrow.
Barbara Hall Nahra
CORRECTION:
The above discussion of retroactivity is incomplete. Retroactive
operation of a statute means that it may apply to causes of action which
arose prior to its effective date. Conversely, prospective operation limits
application of the statute only to those causes of action which arise after
its effective date. See State ex rel. Michaels v. Morse, 165 Ohio St. 599,
138 N.E.2d 660 (1956) ; Sigenfuse v. Jeffrey Manufacturing Co., 32 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 246 (1954). The distinction between a cause of action and a
right of action should be noted. A right of action is a "primary legal right
in Plaintiff." Swankowski v. Diethelm, 98 Ohio App. 271, 273, 129 N.E.2d
182, 184 (1953); Baldridge v. Toombs, 189 N.E.2d 177,179 (C.P. Ohio
1962). A cause of action, on the other hand, consists of every fact which
must be established to sustain a claim for the judicial relief sought. State
v. Preston, 173 Ohio St. 203, 181 N.E.2d 31 (1962).
Section 1.48 of the Ohio Revised Code creates a presumption that
statutory enactments operate prospectively unless a clear legislative in-
tent to the contrary is indicated in the statute. It may be argued that this
statutory rule of construction merely codifies the long-standing judicial
unwillingness to grant retrospective application where no express or
unequivocal legislative intent is evidenced. See Smith v. Ohio Valley
Insurance Co., 27 Ohio St. 2d 268, 272 N.E.2d 131, cert. denied, 405 U.S.
921 (1971); Buckeye Churn Co. v. Abbott, 115 Ohio St. 152, 152 N.E.
391 (1926). However, Ohio case law has followed the common law excep-
tion to this preference.That is, statutes of a remedial or procedural nature
(as opposed to those which affect substantive rights) are applied to all
proceedings after the effective dates of such statutes regardless of when
the cause of a action arose. State ex rel. Holdridge v. Industrial Comm'n,
11 Ohio St. 2d 175, 228 N.E.2d 621 (1967); Smith v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N.E. 637 (1930) ; Elder v. Shoffstall,
90 Ohio St. 265, 107 N.E. 539 (1914). See Bagasarian v. Parker Metal
Co., 282 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1968), for a general discussion of Ohio
common law. Therefore, the courts may allow retrospective operation
where a statutory provision is purely remedial. In determining whether
a statute is remedial or substantive, the court will weigh the effect that
the law in question would have on substantive rights. Gregory v. Flowers,
32 Ohio St. 2d 48, 290 N.E.2d 181 (1972). See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.58
(Page Supp. 1973). Thus, a provision which appears procedural may
be deemed substantive if it injures the rights of one party.
If Ohio Bill 103 operates prospectively only, it will apply to causes of
action arising after the effective date which involve rental agreements
entered into prior to the effective date. Although there are constitutional
prohibitions against the impairment of the obligation of contracts, U.S.
CONST. art. I § 10; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; OHIO CONST. art. II § 28,
these provisions do not prevent a legitimate governmental exercise of the
police power. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934); DePaul v. Kaufman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971); Benjamin
v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957).
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